Kultura ćutanja i tehničko-tehnološke katastrofe – lekcije iz Černobilja

Culture of silence and technical-technological catastrophes – lessons from Chernobyl

Authors

  • Nina Jovanović Student na Fakultetu bezbednosti, Univerzitetut u Beogradu
  • Dušan Ružić Student na Fakultetu bezbednosti, Univerzititetu u Beogradu

Keywords:

kultura ćutanja, autoritarni režimi, tehničko-tehnološke katastrofe, nuklearne katastrofe, Černobilj

Abstract

Koliku štetu čovečanstvu može naneti kultura ćutanja pokazala je praksa kojoj su vlasti u Narodnoj Republici Kini pribegle kada se prvi put saznalo za „čudnu upalu pluća“ u Vuhanu. Posledice ćutanja i prikrivanja ovih dešavanja u Vuhanu bile su višestruke: globalni karantin; vrtoglavi pad svetskih berzi; ekonomska recesija; više od milion mrtvih i preko šezdeset miliona zaraženih. Praksa pokazuje da ovakvom modalitetu reagovanja na probleme najčešće pribegavaju zemlje sa autoritarnim sistemima i duboko neefikasnim državnim aparatima. Jedna takva država koja je postojala najveći deo dvadesetog veka jeste Sovjetski savez. U aprilu 1986. godine dešavaju se problemi sa nuklearnim reaktorom blizu mesta Pripjat u Ukrajini. Iako su posledice radijacije bile poznate, već trideset i više godina u tom trenutku, sovjetske vlasti odlučuju da ne objave šta se dogodilo kako ne bi ispale slabe u očima svog arhineprijatelja Sjedinjenih Država. Da nije bilo drugih država koje su imale instrumente za detekciju nivoa radijacije, verovatno da bi posledice ove nuklearne katastrofe bile daleko veće i daleko razornije od onoga što se dogodilo. Posmatrajući današnje stanje sa ponašanjem vlasti u NR Kini, nameće se zaključak da se lekcija iz Černobilja nije naučila i da se verovatno nikada neće naučiti.

The amount of damage that a culture of silence can bring upon humanity was shown in the practice of the Government of the People’s Republic of China when they first found out about a “strange pneumonia” in the province of Wuhan. The consequences of silence and covering up the events in Wuhan were felt globally and they include: global quarantine; maniacal stock market crashes; more than a million people dead and more than sixty million infected. Practice has shown that the most likely to go down the silence path are countries with authoritarian systems and an inefficient state apparatus. One such country, which existed for the better part of the XX century, is the Soviet Union. In April 1986 problems arise in the nuclear reactor near Pripyat in Ukraine. Even though the consequences of radiation were at that point already known for more than 30 years, the Soviet leadership decided not to publish anything about this event. The reason being, they didn’t want to look weak in the eyes of their archenemy – the US. If there were no other states that had instruments to detect radiation levels, it is likely that the consequences of this nuclear catastrophe would be far greater and far more devastating than what happened. Observing the current situation with the behavior of the authorities in the People's Republic of China, the conclusion is that the lesson from Chernobyl has not been learned and that it will probably never be learned.


Keywords: culture of silence; authoritarian regimes; technical-technological catastrophes; nuclear catastrophes; Chernobyl

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Published

2021-05-22

How to Cite

Jovanović, N., & Ružić, D. (2021). Kultura ćutanja i tehničko-tehnološke katastrofe – lekcije iz Černobilja: Culture of silence and technical-technological catastrophes – lessons from Chernobyl. Zbornik Radova, 1(1), 43–53. Retrieved from http://zbornik.upravljanje-rizicima.edu.rs/index.php/d/article/view/4